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AN ANALYSIS OF "INFORMED CONSENT"
MARCUS L. PLANTE*
I. INTRODUCTION
EE late Justice Frankfurter, in a 1943 opinion, referred to the term
"assumption of risk" as "an excellent illustration of the extent to
which uncritical use of words bedevils the law." He wrote: "A phrase
begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition;
and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly
used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas."'
An example of this phenomenon in the 1960's is the expression "in-
formed consent." It is used most frequently in discussion of the liability
of a physician to his patient. The expression has that "felicity" referred
to by Justice Frankfurter. It is attractive because it seems to suggest a
certain degree of sophistication and discernment on the part of the user.
As its appearance in judicial opinions is relatively recent, it may also sug-
gest that the user is familiar with the latest developments in the field. To
some persons it suggests new vistas of professional liability.
The general thesis of the following discussion is that there is no basic
conceptual, doctrinal or procedural innovation in the "informed consent"
cases;' that the use of this unfortunate journalistic expression has caused
confusion in judicial opinions and in some of the commentary literature; 3
that this confusion has generated litigation and will probably continue to
do so; and that what is needed is a little careful thinking in the legal
profession on some relatively elementary principles of the law of torts.
The source of the trouble is the failure or refusal of some members of
the profession in recent times to recognize distinctions between cases
involving fundamentally different wrongs. In part, this failure may be
attributed to our modern system of pleading, which tolerates looseness of
expression and to some degree fosters fuzzy thinking.4 Occasionally one
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (concurring opinion).
2. In 1918 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in a negligence action against a
physician, upheld a count which was based on the allegation "that it is the duty of a
physician in the exercise of ordinary care to warn a patient of the danger of possible bad
consequences of using a remedy .... ." Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 133, 96 S.E. 360,
366 (1918).
3. See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186,
354 P.2d 670 (1960). One of the more obtuse forays in the subject is found at 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 1445 (1962). Another collection of cases that rambles without benefit of any apparent
guidelines of principle is Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice
"Wonder Drug," 31 Mo. L. Rev. 29 (1966).
4. The late Edson R. Sunderland, during his long service on the faculty of the University
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suspects that the vagueness of the pleading is deliberate and that un-
certainty as to the exact nature of the cause of action attempted to be
stated carries some tactical or other advantage for the pleader.
In part, the failure to recognize basic distinctions may be attributed to
the philosophical approach to teaching torts in certain American law
schools. Less stress is placed on analysis, particularly on the distinctions
between categories of liability. Indeed, such distinctions are sometimes
disparaged as being "legalistic," "technical" anachronisms and vestiges of
the 19th century. Instead, the emphasis is centered on the "social en-
gineering" aspects of tort law. In this framework, the character of the
defendant's wrongful act is less important than are considerations of who
can best afford to bear the loss that has occurred, how it can be most
efficiently transferred to him, and such matters. If counsel or the judge
has that orientation, it is not difficult to perceive how distinctions between
causes of action of differing natures may be lost, or at least their signifi-
cance not appreciated.
A desire for careful identification of the category of wrong involved is
not merely an old-fashioned pedantic longing for legalistic perfection.
Such identification will control the decision of a number of crucial ques-
tions in the case, such as the nature of the physician's duty to the patient,
the kind of evidence required to establish the wrong, and the necessity of
proof of causation and damage. These are the fighting issues in this area
of litigation. If one misconceives the fundamental nature of the case, it is
easy to wander off in a mishmash of generalities and catchwords that
breeds the kind of intellectual chaos that has existed in this area in the
past few years.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE CONFUSION
The story seems to start in 1957 with certain expressions found in an
opinion of the California District Court of Appeals for the First District
(Division 1) in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees."
The case involved paralysis following an aortography procedure per-
formed upon the plaintiff at Stanford University Hospital. The litigation
had many facets, and, on appeal, at least seven issues were discussed by
of Michigan Law School, was one of the outstanding leaders in the field of procedural reform.
He probably did as much or more than any other man in his time to displace the common
law pleading system by code pleading statutes. During my first year on the faculty, when
he was technically retired but amazingly active, it was my privilege to have numerous dis-
cussions with him. He said on one occasion, "The common law system of pleading had one
great virtue; it compelled a lawyer to analyze his case before he started his law suit." One
gains the impression that modern lawyers sometimes start suit without much prior analysis
of the case; at least this occurs quite often in the torts field.
5. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
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the court. One involved the content of an instruction on the physician's
duty to the patient to disclose the dangers of aortography. The court's
view of the law on the subject was stated as follows:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he with-
holds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by
the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the
known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent.
At the same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else
and this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between
two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant
upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result
in alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may as a result
refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in
actually increasing the risks by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension
itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the
patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be
crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must
be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent.6
A few months before the opinion in Salgo was handed down, a thought-
ful article entitled A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, by Professor Allan H. McCoid, appeared in the Minnesota
Law Review.' It contained a comprehensive survey of pertinent cases in
the United States and Canada and an evaluation of the manner in which
they had been handled by the courts. At the risk of doing injustice to
Professor McCoid, his thesis may be summarized as follows: The tradi-
tional assault and battery analysis, when applied to cases involving un-
authorized medical treatment, is often awkward if not erroneous; the
assault and battery approach should be confined to those relatively few
cases in which the physician has engaged in intentional deviations from
practice not intended to be beneficial to the patient; other cases ought
to be tried and decided on other principles. His conclusion is:
The author concludes that the trial and decision of these unauthorized operation cases
would be greatly improved in terms of consistency of theory and appropriateness of
liability if there were a single basis for liability in all malpractice cases, other than
the occasional instance of an actual assault and battery in the sense of an intentional
deviation from practice which does not tend to be beneficial to the patient. The basis
of liability should be deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable and
prudent doctor of the same school of practice as the defendant under similar circum-
stances. The author believes that under such a standard the patient will be properly
protected by the medical profession's own recognition of its obligation to maintain its
standards. One particular obligation which the law may properly exact or impose,
however, is the obligation of a doctor to make a reasonable disclosure to the patient
6. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
7. 41 Minn. L. Rev. 381 (1957).
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of the nature of his illness or infirmity, the nature of the treatment proposed and the
danger of using such treatment or alternative treatment, and then permit the patient
to decide whether to submit to the treatment or not. To overcome any difficulties of
proof, the law may also properly create a presumption that where the patient has not
given express consent to the operation or treatment, there has been a deviation from
the standard of proper medical care, which presumption will impose upon the doctor
the onus of coming forward with justification of his conduct by the use of qualified
medical evidence.8
The Salgo opinion and the McCoid article set the stage for the next
episode. It consisted of two opinions by the Supreme Court of Kansas and
one by the Supreme Court of Missouri. The Kansas opinions were in the
case of Natanson v. Kline.' The first opinion was issued April 9, 1960.
The case was simple. Irma Natanson, suffering from cancer of the breast,
had undergone a radical left mastectomy. At the suggestion of the surgeon
who performed that operation she engaged Doctor John R. Kline for
radiation therapy to the site of the mastectomy and surrounding areas.
Doctor Kline was head of the radiology department at St. Francis Hospi-
tal in Wichita. The therapy was by radioactive cobalt. When it was over,
Mrs. Natanson had suffered a severe injury to the skin, cartilage and bone
of the chest.
In the suit that followed, plaintiff alleged that defendant Kline was
negligent in two general respects, one in the administration of the therapy
(8 specific particulars) and the other in failing to warn plaintiff that the
course of treatment involved great risk of bodily injury or death. The case
was submitted to the jury, which found that defendant Kline was not
guilty of any act of negligence proximately causing the plaintiff's injury.
On appeal from judgment on the verdict, the supreme court acknowledged
that the state of the record was such that the verdict was warranted if the
jury had been properly instructed. The attention of the court was there-
fore on the instructions given at the trial.
On the point of the defendant's negligence in failing to warn plaintiff,
the evidence was conflicting. There was some evidence tending to show
that Mrs. Natanson fully understood the dangers and risks of the treat-
ment. There was also evidence tending to show that Doctor Kline had not
told her anything about the dangers and risks of the treatment she was
about to undergo. Doctor Kline was unable to remember exactly what he
had said to her, and there was nothing in the record that suggested that
he had given any warning. The testimony of plaintiff and her husband
was that Kline had not made any statements to them in the nature of a
warning.
The trial judge refused plaintiff's request for an instruction that if the
8. Id. at 434.
9. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
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jury found that Kline knew that the treatment involved hazard or danger
and did not advise plaintiff thereof, he was guilty of negligence. The
supreme court held that while the requested instruction was "too broad,"
the trial court should have given some instruction on the subject. In
stating the procedure to be followed on retrial, the court said:
[T]he first issue for the jury to determine should be whether the administration of
cobalt irradiation treatment was given with the informed consent of the patient, and
if it was not, the physician who failed in his legal obligation is guilty of malpractice no
matter how skillfully the treatment may have been administered, and the jury should
determine the damages arising from the cobalt irradiation treatment. If the jury should
find that informed consent was given by the patient for such treatment, the jury
should next determine whether proper skill was used in administering the treatment.' 0
This decision and mandate would probably not have attracted special
attention either in the medical or legal profession, had not the court ac-
companied it with a rather discursive opinion which purported to review
various legal aspects of "informed consent" but which seemed to reflect
an alarming confusion of ideas.
After appropriating some of the language used in Professor McCoid's
article," the court cited three cases it deemed pertinent." - One was an
assault and battery case and two appeared to be negligence cases. The
court then made the following statement:
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing cases is that where the physician or
surgeon has affimatively misrepresented the nature of the operation or has failed to
point out the probable consequences of the course of treatment, he may be subjected
to a claim of unauthorized treatment.'3
These words suggested assault and battery. The court then referred to a
privilege that might be recognized in some cases on therapeutic grounds
to withhold diagnosis of a fatal disease (which was not an issue in the
case before it), and then stated: "But in the ordinary case there would
appear to be no such warrant for suppressing facts and the physician
should make a substantial disclosure to the patient prior to the treatment
or risk liability in tort."' 4
Still further in the opinion, after additional discussion of cases, the
court made the following statement:
In considering the obligation of a physician to disclose and explain to the patient in
10. Id. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1107.
11. Compare id. at 401-02, 350 P.2d at 1100, with McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability
for Unauthorized Medical Treatment 41 linn. L. Rev. 381, 424 (1957).
12. 186 Kan. at 404-05, 350 P.2d at 1102. The cited cases are Lester v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88
N.W.2d 186 (1958); Kenny v. Lockwood [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507 (1931).
13. 186 Kan. at 406, 350 P.2d at 1103 (emphasis added).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
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language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed
treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of un-
fortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body, we do not think the
administration of such an obligation, by imposing liability for malpractice if the treat-
ment were administered without such explanation where explanation could reasonably
be made, presents any insurmountable obstacles. 15
Thus the court in rapid succession referred to liability for "unautho-
rized treatment," liability "in tort," and liability "for malpractice." Fur-
thermore, in describing the nature of the disclosure required to avoid
liability, the court used multiple expressions. At one point it suggested
that the rule requires "substantial disclosure;"'" at another "reasonable
disclosure,"17 and at another "full disclosure of the facts necessary to
insure an informed consent."' 8 And finally, to climax the discussion, it
made the following statement:
How the physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient in this difficult
situation involves primarily a question of medical judgment. So long as the disclosure
is sufficient to assure an informed consent, the physician's choice of plausible courses
should not be called into question if it appears, all circumstances considered, that the
physician was motivated only by the patient's best therapeutic interests and he pro-
ceeded as competent medical men would have done in a similar situation.1
It is not surprising that the opinion caused questions to arise in the
minds of counsel. Within a short time a motion for rehearing was made,
supported by the Kansas Medical Society, which was given permission to
file a brief amicus curiae. The motion was denied, but the court handed
down another opinion because "this is a case of first impression in Kansas
and one establishing judicial precedent of the highest importance to the
medical profession ... .2o The motion for rehearing "charged that the
court has confused a malpractice suit, where negligence is an essential
element, with an assault and battery case, where negligence is not an
essential element, thereby giving rise to a hybrid action which is neither
one of negligence nor one of assault and battery, but may be a combina-
tion of the two."'"
15. Id. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 406, 350 P.2d at 1103.
17. Id. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106.
18. Id. at 410, 350 P2d at 1107.
19. Id. at 409-10, 350 P.2d at 1106.
20. 187 Kan. at 187, 354 P.2d at 671.
21. Id. This charge was not entirely without merit. See the careful analysis of tho
opinion in Note, Duty of Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treatment: Battery
or Negligence, 34 S. Cal. L. Rev. 217 (1961). However, it apparently nettled Justice
Schroeder. In the opening part of his second opinion, he wrote: "Perhaps in preoccupation
over the legal obligation of the physician to his patient, the court has not adequately em-
phasized procedural aspects of the case, or reiterated fundamental doctrines in the law of
[Vol. 3 6
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In response to this charge the court emphasized that the case was
pleaded on a negligence theory, that one of the allegations of negligence
was that defendant had failed to warn plaintiff that the course of treat-
ment involved great risk of bodily injury or death, that defendant had
pleaded assumption of risk, and that defendant was fully aware that in-
formed consent of the patient to the hazards of the treatment was an issue
of fact in the case.
The opinion then goes on to state that under the facts and circumstances
presented by the record
appellant was entitled to some explanation concerning the risks and hazards inherent
in the administration of cobalt irradiation treatment .... The appellant was entitled
to a reasonable disclosure by Doctor Kline so that she could intelligently decide
whether to take the cobalt irradiation treatment and assume the risks inherent therein,
or in the alternative to decline this form of precautionary treatment and take a chance
that the cancerous condition in her left breast had not spread beyond the lesion itself
which had been removed by surgery.--
After pointing out that the evidence showed that Doctor Kline gave
appellant no explanation whatever, the court wrote: "On this state of the
record Doctor Kline failed in his legal duty to make a reasonable dis-
closure to the appellant who was his patient as a matter of law. ' The
court then pointed out that under some circumstances failure to make any
disclosure to a patient might be justified where such practice is established
by expert testimony to be in accordance with that of a reasonable medical
practitioner under the same or similar circumstances, but that in this
case no necessity existed to produce medical testimony to show that the
failure of Doctor Kline to give any explanation or make any disclosure
was contrary to accepted medical practice. The court distinguished the
issue of whether Doctor Kline's failure to give an explanation was a cause
of the injury, pointing out that if the jury had found that Mrs. Natanson
was aware of the hazards of irradiation therapy there would be no causal
relationship 4
The value of the second opinion is that it made it clear that the court's
intention was to decide a negligence case and not to impose liability in
assault and battery or to create a hybrid cause of action. The uncertainties
negligence sufficiently to completely avoid efforts to misconstrue the opinion." 187 Kan. at
187, 354 P.2d at 671. At the end of the opinion the following appears: "As almays, an effort
is made by the court to present an opinion in logical sequence, so that consideration of
subsequent issues is dependent upon the disposition of issues previously determined, and if
opinions are analyzed in this manner misinterpretations will be minimized." Id. at 191, 354
P.2d at 674.
22. Id. at 189, 354 P.2d at 672.
23. Id., 354 P.2d at 673.
24. Id. at 190, 354 P2d at 673. See p. 662, infra.
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remaining after the second opinion could be said to be of the kind that
must of necessity be worked out on a case by case basis."
The Missouri decision which contributed to the confusion, Mitchell v.
Robinson,2" was handed down two days after the first opinion in Natan-
son. It involved a claim by a patient against his physician (a psychiatrist)
for fractured vertebrae suffered during an insulin shock treatment which
had been part of a program of treatment extending over a period of time.
One of the bases of his action was that he had not been told of the
hazards connected with this type of treatment. The Missouri Supreme
Court recognized a duty on the part of a physician to advise the patient
of collateral hazards in connection with a proposed medical procedure.
The defendants claimed that they had told the patient about the hazards
attendant upon shock therapy; thus there was a clear issue of fact as to
whether defendants had or had not told him. All that the court held was
that this was a question for the jury. "So in this case, the plaintiff ex-
plicitly denying and the doctors affirming that they had advised the
plaintiff of the hazards of shock therapy, a fact issue was presented upon
which there was no necessity for expert medical testimony."'
Unfortunately, however, just as the first opinion in Natanson,25 the
Mitchell opinion went on to attempt to make a comprehensive statement
of the law, and in the extensive dictum there are several indications of
confusion as to principles and authorities. In referring to the duty of a
physician to make a reasonable disclosure of the hazards attached to a
particular procedure, the court cites as its authority a Minnesota case,
Mohr v. Williams.9 But Mohr was one of the earliest assault and battery
cases in the United States. The court also quoted with approval some of
the excerpts from Professor McCoid's article, referred to in the discussion
of Natanson. Such reference would suggest that the writer of the opinion
was thinking in terms of "malpractice" (negligence) rather than assault
and battery. But the most startling language appears in that paragraph
in which it is suggested that expert evidence is not necessary to establish
whether or not a doctor has complied with his duty to advise the patient
of the hazards involved. It is doubtful that the court meant any more than
that when plaintiff says he was not advised and defendants say he was,
the jury may decide which testimony to believe without the aid of experts.
But the terse phrasing of the thought in the opinion could be interpreted
25. The manner in which the Kansas Supreme Court has done this is discussed at
pp. 662-64, infra.
26. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), aff'd, 360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962).
27. Id. at 16. On re-trial of the case it was found that defendants had advised the patient
of the hazards. 360 S.W.2d at 673.
28. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
29. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). The case was cited in 334 SV.2d at 15.
[Vol. 36
MEDICAL TREATMENT AND RESEARCH
to mean that in "informed consent" cases expert evidence was not needed
at all, even as to what hazards must be disclosed. That it led to this kind
of thinking on the part of some lawyers is evidenced by the case of Aiken
v. Clary,3" discussed below, in which the Missouri Supreme Court recon-
sidered this aspect of the Mitchell opinion.
At this stage in the history of the subject, two annotations appeared
which probably had the effect of intensifying the confusion in the field.
One was a discussion in the NACCA Law Journal 1 which annotated the
Natanson and Mitchell cases. The annotation contains extensive citation
of other cases, but it jumbles the unauthorized operation cases and the
misrepresentation cases in such a fashion that a busy lawyer reading the
annotation in his office could easily get the idea that in a case of unin-
formed consent, liability for assault and battery is automatic. For exam-
ple, at one point the writer says, referring to the Natanson and Mitchell
cases,
In effect, they declare that for the patient's consent to protect the physician from a
charge of professional negligence, it must be an "informed" consent. An uninformed
consent is as meaningless as one induced by misrepresentation. Breach by the physician
of his affirmative duty to inform the patient of risks inherent in proposed treatment
vitiates the patient's consent, exposing the physician to liability for negligence, re-
gardless of the skill with which the treatment is administered....
It is settled that, in the absence of an emergency, adults of sound mind are entitled
to determine whether their bodies shall be touched, by whom they shall be touched,
and for what purposes they shall be touched. In other words, the physician-patient
relationship is deemed consensual, and physicians are liable for unauthorized treat-
ment, dealt with as an intentiot~al tort, where treatment is rendered without the con-
sent, express or implied, of the patient.32
This passage is followed by an extensive citation of assault and battery
cases.
In the next subdivision of the article it is asserted that the result of the
Natanson and Mitchell cases "receives analogical support from a line
of cases holding the physician liable for intentional tort where the patient's
consent is induced by express misrepresentations. If the doctor misrepre-
sents the nature of the proposed treatment or the risks involved, such
misstatements vitiate the patient's consent, leaving the doctor vulnerable
to a trespass action."33
Whether the writer intended it or not, a reader of this annotation might
very well conclude that a physician who breached his duty to disclose to
a patient the risks of a procedure he was planning to undertake would
30. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
31. 26-27 NACCA LJ. 134 (1960-61).
32. Id. at 137-38 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 139.
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expose himself to an assault and battery claim. It is true that in the
annotation the term "negligence" appears several times, but its impor-
tance is significantly underplayed.
Similar confusion appears in an A.L.R. annotation on the subject pub-
lished in 1961.1' Cases of unauthorized treatment were mingled indis-
criminately with cases involving negligence and no attempt was made
to make a careful distinction between the nature of the wrongs involved.
As a result of the foregoing writings, many lawyers in the country in
1961 could discern expanded possibilities of actions based on a violation
of the so-called informed consent rule. Not only did it appear to open up
a new basis of professional liability, but, even more important, it appeared
to be one that could be imposed without the necessity of expert medical
testimony. The difficulty of securing expert medical testimony has long
been a source of unhappiness among lawyers seeking to impose profes-
sional liability for negligence upon physicians. The informed consent route
may well have appeared to some to be the path out of the wilderness. 6
III. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES
Let us start by identifying some elementary tort doctrines. The legal
wrong conventionally called "battery" or "assault and battery" consists
of an unpermitted touching of the person of another; by definition a
touching is not tortious if there has been consent to it by the one touched.
Consent can be rendered nugatory under some circumstances. One of
these circumstances is inducement of the consent by a certain kind of
misrepresentation. Not every misrepresentation will have this vitiating
effect. In order to negate consent the misrepresentation must relate to
the nature and character of the touching. If it does, the touching is tor-
tious (a battery) because it is no longer with the consent of the one
touched.36 Misrepresentation that does not relate to the nature and charac-
ter of the touching but merely concerns some collateral matter does not
have the fatal effect. The classic example is given as illustration one to
section 57 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "A, to induce B to sub-
mit to intimate familiarities, offers her a paper which A represents to be
a twenty dollar bill but which he knows to be counterfeit. B, believing
34. Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961).
35. See, e.g., 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 768, 771 nn.18-19 (1961). This note, in contrast to
most of the writing at the time, envisioned some of the problems that were likely to develop
as a result of the Natanson and Mitchell opinions.
36. Hobbs v. Kizer, 236 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1916) (abortion operation misrepresented);
Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co., 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1957) (insurance man misrepresented
himself as a physician and made a physical examination of female applicant) ; cf. People v.
Steinberg, 190 Misc. 413, 73 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Magis. Ct. N.Y.C. 1947) (smallpox vaccination
with water misrepresented to be serum).
[Vol. 36
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the paper to be a genuine bill, submits. A is not liable to B for battery."
Similarly, in Martin v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corporation,"
plaintiff was examined by a physician who represented that he was duly
licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee. In fact, he was not so licensed.
It was claimed that because of the misrepresentation of his status as a
licensed physician the touching of plaintiff, to which she had consented,
was unlawful (tortious) and constituted an assault and battery. A demur-
rer to the declaration was sustained.38
Let me illustrate the thought by contrasting two modern cases involving
physicians' professional liability. In Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital39
plaintiff submitted to a prostate operation, a necessary part of which
involved the severance and tying off of the spermatic cords. Defendant
physician could not recall having told him about the tying procedure. The
action was for "assault or unauthorized operation." The lower court dis-
missed the action. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed and granted
a new trial, holding that a jury question was presented as to whether plain-
tiff consented to the severance of his spermatic cords. Here it would seem
we have a clear case in which, if the jury believed the testimony of plain-
tiff, there was a misrepresentation of the nature and character of the
touching; it was done by failure to disclose when there was an obligation
to speak because of the physician-patient relationship. This is not a case
of failure to disclose a risk that may or may not arise in the course of the
operation, although occasionally it has been so interpreted;4 1 it is simply
misrepresentation by silence as to a very material and important aspect
of the nature and character of the medical procedure to be applied. Thus
any supposed consent is vitiated, and there is a plain unpermitted touching
or battery of the plaintiff.
On the other hand, the Mitclell case, in the writer's view, is quite dif-
ferent. The plaintiff submitted to treatment by defendant physician in-
volving "electro-shock and insulin sub-coma therapy" in the course of
which he suffered a convulsion and fracture of three vertebrae. It was
established that one of the unpredictable results of insulin shock is con-
vulsion in which there is a substantial risk of fractured vertebrae, legs
and similar injuries. There was no evidence of negligence in the diagnosis
or the administration of treatment. In the opinion of the court, the ques-
tion was whether "the doctors owed their patient in possession of his
faculties the duty to inform him generally of the possible serious col-
lateral hazards; and ... there was a submissible fact issue of whether
37. 184 Tenn. 166, 197 S.W.2d 798 (1946).
38. See also Oberlin v. Upson, 84 Ohio St. 111, 95 N.E. 511 (1911).
39. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
40. W. Prosser, Torts 107 (3d Ed. 1964).
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the doctors were negligent in failing to inform him of the dangers of shock
therapy."41
It is submitted that the difference between the two foregoing cases is
fundamental. In Bang, plaintiff thought he was going to be touched in a
certain way (operation on his prostate gland, possibly surgery on the
bladder) but was subjected to a touching of a substantially different
character (severance of spermatic cords). In Mitchell, plaintiff thought
he was going to be touched in a certain way (insulin injection). He was
touched in exactly that way, but there was a harmful result arising from
a collateral risk he had not been warned about. The fundamental point
is not what name we give to the two categories of cases as long as what
we call them depicts two basically different wrongs which call for quite
different treatment by the courts and quite different self-protective steps
to be taken by the physician. It is fatal to clear understanding to inter-
mingle the two under some broad heading such as "malpractice" or to
state that both involve "informed consent." For purposes of this dis-
cussion I will refer to the first type of case (Bang) as a "battery"42 and to
the second type of case (Mitchell) as "medical negligence.""
It should be emphasized again that much more than a mere technical
distinction is involved. Our concern is with fundamental, practical dif-
ferences that may affect the pivotal issues in the cause of action. We now
turn to an anlysis of these practical consequences.
IV. PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES
A. Nature of Plaintiff's Right and Defendant's Duty
1. Battery Cases
It is clear in the battery cases that a patient has virtually an absolute
right to be free from touchings of a substantially different nature and
character from those to which he has consented. It is the patient's preroga-
tive to accept medical treatment or to take his chances of living without
it. A long line of authority recognizes this right. As was stated in one
of the leading opinions by Chief Judge Cardozo: "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. '
41. 334 S.W.2d at 19.
42. I share Professor McCoid's distaste for the term, but its use here will underscore the
thrust of this article.
43. This term seems well suited to describe the nature of the wrongful act involved.
44. Schloendorff v. Society of The New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). Probably the leading case is Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
The successors to these cases are legion. In a 1965 Illinois case it was held that under proper
[Vol. 36
MEDICAL TREATMENT AND RESEARCH
To this general principle there are only a few limited exceptions, none of
which is relevant here.
Conversely, it is clear that the physician has a fiduciary relationship
to his patient and owes an absolute obligation never to mislead the patient
by words or silence as to the nature and character of the medical pro-
cedure he proposes to undertake." Despite occasional complaints, this
duty does not seem to be unduly burdensome. It requires only that the
physician speak plainly in the patient's language. Little sympathy is
evoked by the occasional assertion that the nature and character of
medical procedures cannot be explained without the use of highly tech-
nical language. Indeed, the use of technical terminology may embody con-
siderable danger. A striking case in point involved a mastectomy. De-
fendant surgeon examined plaintiff's breast, found danger signals and
recommended a test. According to plaintiff's testimony, defendant called
the hospital in her presence and made reference to the removal of a breast.
Plaintiff told the doctor that he was not to remove her breast, and he said
he had no intention of doing so. When plaintiff reached the hospital she
signed a form giving consent to a "mastectomy." Plaintiff later testified
she didn't know what the word meant. Later that same day she again
told defendant he was to make a test only and not remove the breast.
When plaintiff emerged from anesthesia, the breast had been removed.
Plaintiff sued, basing one count of her claim on the theory that defendant
had performed the operation without her consent. The trial court granted
a motion to dismiss. On appeal the dismissal was reversed. The court held
that there was a jury question as to whether plaintiff "had withdrawn
her consent," thus avoiding the question whether the consent was ever
valid at all. If there had been no conversation after the consent was
signed, however, the question of original validity would have been pre-
sented and could easily have been decided in plaintiff's favor.4
An illustration of how this result might occur is found in Gray v. Grun-
nagle.Y The patient submitted to what he was told would be an "explora-
tory operation." He understood this to mean that an incision would be
made in his spinal column solely for the purpose of diagnosis, that when
diagnosis was complete no effort would be made at corrective surgery but
that he would be sewn up and in due course advised of the nature of the
illness, and that he could then determine whether he wanted to undergo
the corrective procedures. To the physicians, however, the term "explora-
circumstances this right was protected by the Constitution of the United States. In re Estate
of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
45. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
46. Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P2d 173 (1955).
47. 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966).
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tory operation" meant that an incision would be made at the appropriate
part of the spinal column and an effort made to identify the source of
trouble, and that, if identified, every effort would then be made to elim-
inate or correct the pathology, or alleviate the symptoms. An attempted
corrective procedure was performed followed by injurious results. Plain-
tiff's complaint embraced both a theory of medical negligence and a theory
of medical procedure without consent. The jury rendered a verdict for
$80,000 for plaintiff, but the lower court gave judgment for defendant
n6twithstanding the verdict. This action was reversed on appeal and
judgment entered on the verdict. Although the evidence did not justify
a finding of medical negligence, it did justify a finding that the procedure
had been done without the consent of the patient. The decision was
reached because of the patient's misunderstanding of the terminology
used in securing his consent, despite the broad terms of a written consent
he had signed upon entering the hospital.
The use of vague and ambiguous language may bring similar conse-
quences. In Paulsen v. Gundersen,48 plaintiff had been receiving treatment
for ear trouble and was advised to have an operation. When he asked
about its seriousness, he was told that it would be a "simple" mastoid
operation. He consented to it. The surgeon performed a "radical" mastoid
operation which was followed by loss of hearing and paralysis of part of
plaintiff's face. The action was based in part on the theory that the opera-
tion had been performed without plaintiff's consent. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held that the evidence warranted submission to the jury of
the question whether defendant caused the radical mastoid operation to
be performed on the plaintiff without his consent and that, if so, liability
would follow.
Wall v. Brim4 9 presents a variation of the general theme involving a
failure to disclose. Plaintiff underwent a procedure involving an incision
in the neck just under and back of the ear for removal of a cyst. When
it was finished she had suffered a serious injury which caused considerable
facial disfigurement with disability of her mouth, tongue and eyes. Plain-
tiff had been told by the surgeon before surgery that it was a "very simple
operation" which would not take more than five or ten minutes and the
cyst could be pulled out "like hulling a pea out of a pod." After the in-
cision was made, the surgeon discovered that the cyst was deeply em-
bedded and in close proximity to the facial nerve. He continued with the
operation without any disclosure of these facts to plaintiff who was fully
conscious, the operation being performed under a local anestheic. Plaintiff
sued on a negligence theory. The jury verdict was for plaintiff and from
48. 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.V. 448 (1935).
49. 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 145 F.2d 492 (1944).
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judgment thereon defendant appealed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that there was insufficient evidence to establish negligence because
under the applicable law (Georgia) expert evidence was required and had
not been adduced. However, the evidence suggested what appeared to be
an operation without the consent of plaintiff, and the case was remanded
for trial and development on that theory. The court's reasoning was that
the surgeon, having previously described the operation as a simple one
and then having discovered that it was a complicated and different one,
had a duty so to advise plaintiff, particularly as she was conscious at the
time. While his failure to do so would not support a negligence action, it
could support an action for unpermitted operation.
The foregoing cases seem to demonstrate that the courts recognize a
clear and simple right on the part of an individual not to be misled as to
the nature and character of the intended touching to which he is being
asked to consent, whether that misleading is by omission to speak, by
overt misstatement, or by use of ambiguous language or technical terms.
Accordingly, the physician has a clear and simple duty not to mislead
the patient whether by silence, misinformation or ambiguity.
2. Medical Negligence Cases
When the case involves no substantial misunderstanding of the nature
and character of the touching, but plaintiff claims he was not fully or
correctly informed as to collateral hazards attendant upon the procedure,
the judicial approach is quite different from that found in battery cases.
Here defendant-physician's obligation and plaintiff-patient's correspond-
ing right is less certain in nature, more flexible in character and subject
to considerable variation. While it is often stated as a general proposition
that the patient has the right to be advised of collateral hazards and the
physician has the duty so to advise him, most cases have recognized,
starting with Salgo, ° that this obligation is not rigid and cannot be pre-
scribed with specificity. It is only a part of the broad obligation of the
physician to use reasonable care, but as any sophisticated person knows,
the elasticity in that concept is more than negligible.
It is enlightening to examine briefly some factors that impress courts
in shaping plaintiff's right and defendant's duty. While all factors cannot
be identified because they are as varied as human disease and illness, one
can discern in the opinions certain recurring elements to which the courts
seem to ascribe importance.
One consideration often mentioned is whether the case is an emergency
requiring immediate treatment. This aspect usually appears in a negative
fashion; i.e., in buttressing the conclusion that defendant owed a duty to
50. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
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disclose collateral hazards, the court emphasizes that no emergency made
it impractical to perform the duty. For example, in Bowers v. Talmage,"'
the claim was that parents had not been warned of a hazard to their nine-
year-old child from an arteriogram, an exploratory surgical process. The
procedure was considered dangerous since three percent of the cases had
injurious results. It caused partial paralysis of the boy. In holding that it
was error to direct a verdict for defendant, the court emphasized that
there was no emergency.
Similarly a case in which plaintiff suffered dermatitis as a result of
injections of gold compound by defendant in treatment for rheumatoid
arthritis, one claim was that there had not been sufficient advice of the
hazards incident to use of gold. The court wrote, "We are of the opinion
that, under the facts and circumstances disclosed by this record, including
the fact that no emergency existed, defendant was obligated to make a
reasonable disclosure to his patient of the known dangers which were
incident to or possible in the proposed use of gold ... ""
Indeed, in Natanson (second opinion)r 3 and Mitchell,"' in partial ex-
planation of the decision that a duty of disclosure existed, each court
stressed that no immediate medical action was necessary. The Kansas
Court said, "There was no emergency calling for immediate attention,""
and the Missouri Court said, "There was no emergency here, it was not
even claimed that Mitchell was critically or dangerously ill and that im-
mediate spectacular treatment was imperative.""0 This is not to say that
if there is an emergency no duty of disclosure exists. What is suggested
is that the absence of emergency is a circumstance likely to impress a
court in determining the extent of the physician's obligation.
A second factor, and perhaps the one most frequently referred to by
courts in delineating the physician's duty, is the danger of alarming the
patient or causing other adverse psychological effects on him. The Salgo
opinion," in its initial description of the duty, showed an understanding
that under some circumstances a reference to collateral hazards may in-
crease the risk to the patient because of the emotional consequences. The
Natanson case approved the Salgo language and recognized (at least in
the second opinion) that a situation might exist in which the duty to refer
to collateral hazards would be minimal. 8
51. 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1963).
52. DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (mem.) (2d Dep't
1965).
53. 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
54. 334 S.W.2d 11, 18-19 (Mo. 1960), aff'd, 360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962).
55. 187 Kan. at 189, 354 P.2d at 672.
56. 334 S.W.2d at 18-19.
57. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 560, 317 P.2d at 170. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
58. 187 Kan. at 189, 354 P.2d at 673.
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In a case involving hepatitis and jaundice allegedly resulting from in-
jections of gold compound, a dismissal of the action was affirmed. The
court was substantially influenced by medical testimony to the effect "that
the judgment of the individual doctor had to be exercised in the light
of the mental and psychosomatic make-up of the patient in advising of
the risk involved. . ... 59
In a suit involving injury to throat nerves during a thyroidectomy, on
the question whether the patient had been sufficiently advised of that
hazard, the court said: "Doctors frequently tailor the extent of their
pre-operative warnings to the particular patient, and with this I can find
no fault. Not only is much of the risk of a technical nature beyond the
patient's understanding, but the anxiety, apprehension, and fear generated
by a full disclosure thereof may have a very detrimental effect on some
patients.""ea
Another case of this kind involved injury to recurrent laryngeal nerves
during thyroidectomy. While recognizing the existence of a general duty
to disclose hazards, the court pointed out that the patient had been ad-
vised that she faced a "serious operation" and that it was "not done
without risks." The court continued: "Difficulty arises in attempting to
state any hard and fast rule as to the extent of the disclosure required.
The doctor's primary duty is to do what is best for the patient. Any con-
flict between this duty and that of a frightening disclosure ordinarily
should be resolved in favor of the primary duty." 1
A third factor that influences the decision as to whether there is a duty
to disclose collateral dangers is the likelihood that the danger will ma-
terialize. The greater the frequency of injury from it, the greater the
obligation of the physician to mention it and vice-versa. For example, one
case involved abdominal infection following an operation. In finding that
judgment was properly entered for defendant, the court said:
In the instant case we are not dealing with a known existing condition but, rather,
with a mere possibility that infection might follow the operation. No claim is made
that defendant Young had knowledge, or believed, that such would be the case. The
question presented is in substance whether a physician and surgeon before operating
should advise the patient of all possible results. Whether such should be done would
seem to be a matter to be determined with reference to the general practice customarily
followed by the medical profession in the locality.6
59. Woods v. Pommerening, 44 Wash. 2d 867, 871, 271 P.2d 705, 707 (1954).
60. Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
61. Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964). See also Sharp v.
Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967), in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
recognized the duty of a physician to warn of dangers attendant upon use of chloromycetin,
but refrained from attempting to define the extent and limits of the duty.
62. Roberts v. Young, 369 Afich. 133, 139-40, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1963).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Similarly in Bowers v. Talmage,0 in which the exploratory arteriogram
was performed, the court took into account the fact that death, paralysis
or serious injury resulted in three percent of the cases, a level of danger
deemed relatively high. It was held error to dismiss the action.
In Fiscker v. Wilmington General Hospital4 the relatively low inci-
dence of the collateral hazard was relied on, inter alia, to warrant a finding
of no duty to disclose. Plaintiff had experienced an incomplete abortion
and had been bleeding. Defendant had 500 cc's of whole blood transfused
to her, from which she contracted hepatitis. Her action was based largely
on the ground that she had not been warned that hepatitis was a hazard
of blood transfusion. Defendant's affidavits showed that the risk of trans-
mitting hepatitis in a transfusion of whole blood was unavoidable but it
was slight because the disease occurs in less than one percent of such
transfusions. The court held defendant did not have a duty to advise
plaintiff of this risk, basing its decision in part on the infrequency of its
incidence.
The foregoing enumeration is not intended as an exhaustive list of the
factors taken into account by courts in determining the nature of the
duty owed by a physician to his patient to make disclosure of collateral
hazards. They are illustrative, however, of aspects of the case on which
it would be appropriate for counsel to introduce evidence. They suggest
reasons why a physician's duty will vary greatly from one case to another.
For the purposes of this discussion they underscore the point that when
the basis of the case is medical negligence as opposed to battery, the
physician has a much wider range of discretion and the elements weighed
in evaluating his conduct are more numerous. These authorities warrant
the conclusion that when a physician tells a patient what he proposes to
do, he has a strict duty to explain the nature and character of the pro-
cedure in terms that the patient can understand, but that when the physi-
cian is considering whether he should disclose collateral hazards to the
patient he may take into account many things other than the plain use of
language. This conclusion has important implications in subsequent liti-
gation. A physician sued in a battery case has relatively little "elbow
room" in which to establish a defense. A physician sued for medical negli-
gence in failing to disclose hazards has many more possibilities on which
to base a defense under the circumstances that existed. Herein lies one
of the significant practical reasons why the distinction suggested at the
outset of this paper should be kept intact.
63. 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1963).
64. 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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B. Proof of Wrongfd Act
The crucial issue in a large percentage of cases involving physicians'
professional liability is whether testimony by medical experts is required
to establish the defendant's wrongful act. Decision of this issue frequently
decides the lawsuit. It is in this connection that the distinction between
battery and medical negligence may be of controlling significance.
1. Battery Cases
In the battery cases, as indicated above, the factual issue is quite sim-
ple. Did the physician, by the words he spoke, or by his failure to speak,
or by his incomplete statement, or by his failure to explain written words,
leave the patient with a substantial misunderstanding as to the general
nature and character of the touching which the patient was to undergo?
This is not a technical problem. It is not an issue which requires expert
knowledge. It involves no more than an understanding of English and its
usage plus the ability to assess the effect certain words might have or
the meaning to be derived from certain expressions.
Some of the cases already mentioned illustrate the point. In Bang,Z
the case in which plaintiff submitted to a prostate operation in the course
of which defendant surgeon, as a part of the operation, severed and tied
off the spermatic cords thereby rendering plaintiff sterile, the issue was
whether plaintiff had ever been informed by defendant that severance of
his spermatic cords was part of the operation. Defendant could not recall
definitely whether "that particular detail of the operation was discussed
with Mr. Bang or not." Here it is obvious there was no need to bring in
an expert. This was not a matter of a collateral "hazard" or "risk" of an
operation that might or might not develop. It was apparently a planned
part of the procedure. It might have been a "detail" to the physician, but
it surely would be deemed an important one by most people. The issue
is not whether the physician should have told the patient about it. The
issue is whether the physician did tell the patient about it. Plaintiff's testi-
mony was that he was not told about it. Twelve non-medical people can
decide that issue without outside help just as reliably as they can decide
a simple sales case, where the question is what statements the parties
made or did not make to each other.
Similarly, in Corn,6" the case involving the mastectomy, the evidence
suggested that plaintiff was not familiar with the word, that defendant
physician did not explain it, that their oral exchange had indicated to
her that he was not going to remove her breast, and that she repeatedly
said she did not want it removed. Here again there is no necessity for
65. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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expert evidence. Any jury of intelligent laymen can understand the dis-
pute and make a reasonably reliable judgment as to whether Mrs. Corn
did or did not consent to have her breast removed.
Some cases may not be as open and shut as the two last mentioned.
For example, in Paulsen v. Gundersen,67 the surgeon described the pro-
cedure he intended to perform as a "simple" mastoid operation; actually
what he performed was a "radical" mastoid operation. While it is not
quite as clear that laymen may be left to their own judgment here, one
can understand a court holding that the case does not necessitate expert
testimony. The ultimate issue is whether the operation performed was in
substance the same as or different from the operation to which consent
was given. While an expert might be needed to describe the difference be-
tween the two procedures, the ultimate question whether plaintiff under-
stood the difference and comprehended what he was about to undergo is
basically a question for lay judgment. Similarly, in Wall,"8 the case in-
volving the cyst in the neck, the decision was whether the procedure de-
fendant ultimately engaged in was substantially the same as that which
he described to plaintiff. This is one that is surely within the competence
of laymen in appraising the meaning of language and the manner in which
ordinary English words are understood by ordinary people.
To repeat, the essential question in this kind of case is not whether de-
fendant should have told plaintiff what he was going to do; it is whether
he did tell plaintiff what he was going to do. The law gives plaintiff a
right to know what kind of a touching he is to undergo. The decision for
the jury is whether defendant conveyed an adequate impression of what
was intended. On this question expert evidence serves no useful purpose.
2. Medical Negligence Cases
When we turn to medical negligence cases, proof of defendant's wrong-
ful act presents quite a different problem. The question is not whether
defendant conveyed a clear impression of the nature and character of
the intended touching. It is assumed he did so. The question is whether
defendant violated his obligation to the patient to describe collateral con-
sequences that might ensue as a result of the intended and permitted
touching, or from some other source such as the healing process.
As early as 1959 there was a clear recognition in the Superior Court
of Delaware that the question whether a physician should warn a patient
of collateral hazards attendant upon a medical procedure is a medical
question on which lay judges and juries are not competent to make a deci-
sion. The case was Fischer v. Wilmington General Hospital,0 in which
67. 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935).
68. 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
69. 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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plaintiff contracted hepatitis as a result of a transfusion of whole blood.
The propriety of the transfusion was not seriously questioned, but plain-
tiff and her husband based their claim upon the failure of defendant to
advise them of the danger of contracting hepatitis. As indicated above,"
affidavits filed by defendant indicated that the risk of contracting hepa-
titis, while unavoidable, materialized in less than one percent of such
transfusions. One of the affidavits of a local physician, however, also con-
tained the following statement: ". . . it is not my practice or the practice
generally within the medical profession in this locality to advise patients
of the risk of such infection, since the psychological and psychosomatic
effect of the alarm which would be produced by such advice would run
counter to the beneficial effect sought to be produced by the transfusion
itself. m7a
On the basis of the foregoing statement, which was undisputed, the
court held that no jury question was presented and defendant's motion
for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted.
Thus, before Natanson in Kansas, there was this record in at least one
of the appellate courts of the country that on this essentially medical
problem expert evidence was relevant and could be controlling. While
both the Salgo and Natanson opinions may have recognized this principle
by implication, neither opinion set forth an unambiguous indication of
the need for expert evidence.
In a 1961 case, the Supreme Court of Delaware approved the principle.
Plaintiff underwent a thyroidectomy in the course of which she suffered
an injury to the recurrent laryngeal nerves which caused a substantial
loss in her vocal power. No negligence was found in the procedure by
the surgeon but the claim was based largely on the theory that she had
not been warned that this injury was a hazard of this type of surgery.
Defendant's counsel introduced medical testimony which was unanimous
that: "it was not the practice of surgeons in the Wilmington area to warn
patients of the possibility of resultant injury to the recurrent laryngeal
nerves from a thyroidectomy."' The court held that as this evidence was
undisputed it followed that there was no duty imposed upon defendant to
warn plaintiff of the possibility that she might suffer the injury. 2
The requirement of expert medical evidence is carried even further by
a substantial line of cases holding that the absence of evidence showing
70. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
70a. Id. at 561, 149 A.2d at 753.
71. Difilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 550, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
72. See also Woods v. Pommerening, 44 Wash. 2d 867, 271 P.2d 705 (1954). In Ball v.
Malinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964), in which judgment for
defendant based on a jury verdict was affirmed, the court approved an instruction that gave
the physician broad leeway in determining the extent to which be would warn the patient of
the potentially dangerous results of a translumbar aortogram.
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a practice to warn requires a directed verdict or a dismissal of the action.
One of the first such cases appeared in 1962. Plaintiff underwent a vein
stripping operation by defendent. She claimed he used more incisions than
she had been led to believe would be used (which he denied) and that he
had failed to advise her that there would be scars and disfigurement on
the leg. The court made several statements which indicated that it re-
garded the latter claim as a question for expert testimony. For example:
But, how a physician chooses to discharge his obligations to a patient involves pri-
marily a question of medical judgment. ... [W]hether or not a surgeon is under a
duty to warn a patient of the possibility of a specific adverse result of a proposed
treatment depends upon the circumstances of the particular case and upon the general
practice followed by the medical profession in the locality; and the custom of the
medical profession to warn must be established by expert medical testimony.3
There have been at least two cases in Michigan in which a similar
view has been taken. One was in the Supreme Court in 1963. It was
Roberts v. Young,74 in which plaintiff brought action against a physician
because of infection in the abdomen following a Caesarean operation and
the ligation of her tubes. No evidence was adduced to show negligence in
the performance of the operation. It was suggested by counsel for plaintiff
that a possible basis for liability was that the physician had failed to dis-
close to plaintiff the danger of an infection following this kind of operation
and procedure. At the end of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a
directed verdict; the trial judge granted the motion and gave judgment
for defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed and with respect to the matter
of failure to warn made the following statements:
The question presented is in substance whether a physician and surgeon before operat-
ing should advise the patient of all possible results. Whether such should be done
would seem to be a matter to be determined with reference to the general practice
customarily followed by the medical profession in the locality. . . . As before indi-
cated, whether such possibility should have been discussed with the patient is a mat-
ter to be determined in accordance with the general practice customarily observed by
practitioners in good standing of defendant Young's school of treatment. 75
In Miles v. Van Gelder76 plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of a
myelogram to confirm findings indicating a ruptured disc. In the suit that
73. Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Wyo. 1962) (emphasis added).
74. 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963).
75. Id. at 140, 119 N.W.2d at 630. In some cases courts have expressly disavowed any
requirement that a physician advise the patient of all possible risks. In Bell v. Umstattd,
401 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) the court said, "It would, indeed, be unreasonable
and undesirable to place a burden of full and complete disclosure upon each and every
specialist involved as to the specific methods intended to be used in an operation and all of
the possible risks involved in each step of an operation." See also Valentine v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hosps. 194 Cal. App. 2d 282, 15 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1961).
76. 1 Mch. App. 522, 137 N.W.2d 292 (1965).
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followed, one of the allegations was that defendant failed to advise plain-
tiff of the reasonable expectations of risk and harm from the procedures
so that plaintiff was given no opportunity to make a reasonably informed
choice. In that connection the court referred to the Roberts case cited
above and pointed out that this allegation could not be the basis for a
recovery because "there is a complete lack of medical evidence as to the
standard of practice followed by practitioners in the community on ad-
vising a patient of reasonable expectations of risk and possibility of harm
from the operation proposed. 77 Similar holdings appear in Iowa and
Florida."
Like all questions of fact, however, this one may be decided as a matter
of law under appropriate circumstances. Such a decision is usually war-
ranted when there is no substantial dispute in the evidence and when the
inference to be drawn is so clear that reasonable minds could not differ.
For example, in the Natanson case, second opinion,7" the court indicated
that if it were found that Doctor-Kline did not say anything at all to Mrs.
Natanson about the hazards of irradiation, he "failed in his legal duty...
as a matter of law.""0 In view of the circumstances of that case there is
nothing very shocking about that position. A similar approach, but with the
opposite result, appears in Roberts v. Wood."' Plaintiff, who had had a
thyroidectomy some years previously, underwent a second. The recurrent
laryngeal nerves were injured and plaintiff lost much of her voice. One of
her claims of negligence was that she had not been sufficiently advised as
to the seriousness of the operation. The evidence showed that defendant
had told her that the operation would be similar to the prior one, that she
was an emotional person suffering anxiety, apprehension and fear and
that the physician took this mental or emotional state into account in
determining the extent to which he should refer to the dangers of the
operation. The court held as a matter of law that the physician's duty of
disclosure had been fulfilled. 2
An interesting variation appears in Block v. McVay. The physician
gave the patient information about the prospective operation, but he had
made a mistake in diagnosis. He thought that he was dealing with a tumor
in a lymph node and told plaintiff the operation was a "simple, ordinary
and frequently performed procedure." As the operation progressed he
77. Id. at 532, 137 N.W.2d at 297.
78. Grosjean v. Spencer, 140 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1966); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d
226 (Fla. App. 1965).
79. 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
80. Id. at 189, 354 P.2d at 673.
81. 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
82. See also Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E2d 762 (1955).
83. 80 S.D. 469, 126 N.W.2d 808 (1964).
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found it was a neurofibroma, a benign nerve tumor. Its removal was a
much more serious procedure. In the course of doing it, some minute nerve
fibres were severed as a result of which plaintiff suffered numbness of her
right arm and thumb. Plaintiff claimed that she had not been properly
advised of the hazards of the operation. The court found that there was no
negligence in making the erroneous diagnosis and that, on the basis, of it
defendant had fulfilled his obligation to the patient in telling her that the
operation was a simple one. A directed verdict for defendant was affirmed.
In a case in which the court decides the issue for plaintiff as a matter
of law, it is possible for a hasty or unsophisticated reader to conclude
erroneously that the court is treating the case as if it were one of battery,
especially if the opinion does not make the distinction entirely clear. The
decision is capable of being misconstrued as a holding that expert evidence
is not required on the issue of "informed consent." This is what seems
to have happened in Natanson and, as we shall see below, seven years
later the Kansas Supreme Court is still explaining what it meant in those
opinions. 4
Another type of case that has potential for confusion is one in which
the standard practice of disclosure is established but where there is a
conflict in the testimony as to whether the physician made the required
disclosure. Here again no expert evidence is required. The jury is capable
of determining unaided which side it will believe. An example is Wilson v.
Scott."8 The standard of disclosure, which was established by defendant's
own testimony, was that in the case of a stapedectomy it was the practice
to advise the patient that he had an 89 per cent chance of achieving good
hearing in the ear following surgery, a 10 per cent chance of no increase
in hearing and a 1 per cent chance of a loss in hearing. Plaintiff suffered a
loss in hearing. The defendant surgeon testified that he had advised the
patient exactly in the manner described. The patient denied that he had
been so informed. The court held that in these circumstances there was
no need for expert testimony, and that the case should be tried on that
basis. The Wilson case ought not to cause confusion, however, because
the opinion of the majority makes perfectly clear what it holds and the
point is driven home by a dissenting opinion.
It is interesting to observe that, in the years that have followed the
Natanson and Mitchell opinions, both the Kansas and Missouri Supreme
Courts have made efforts to rectify the deficiencies of those opinions and
to align the law with that of other jurisdictions in the United States. The
84. See, e.g., Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967).
85. 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967). The decision in the intermediate appellate court (396
S.W.2d 532 Tex. App. 1966) is the subject of a well-considered note in 44 Texas L. Rev. 799
(1966).
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first of these efforts came in Kansas. A three-year-old boy with a con-
genital heart condition underwent cardiac catheterization. In the course
of it, the child awakened from the anesthetic and started struggling; 100
milligrams of sodium pentothal were injected into his bloodstream through
the heart catheter. Within 20 seconds his heart rate slowed and his blood
pressure was not obtainable; a few hours later he died. Suit was brought
on the theory that although the parents realized that there was some
danger in the operation they had not been fully informed of the hazard
that had developed. The testimony of one of the experts was that there
was some risk in the use of sodium pentothal. The Kansas Supreme Court
responded as follows:
Notwithstanding the complete disclosure on the part of the defendant doctors, plain-
tiffs offered no evidence of what a reasonable physician would do under like and similar
circumstances .... The evidence clearly shows that plaintiffs were informed of the
nature of the procedure and of the things the doctors were undertaking to do. They
had the facts upon which to base their decision, and we are of the opinion the parents
were fully informed. The record is devoid of any standard of care required of the
defendant doctors, much less any violation of such standards, known or unknown.
The evidence introduced by the plaintiffs was wholly insufficient to establish a case
of liability against any of the defendants. It also was insufficient to permit a jury to
speculate as to what the defendants should or should not have done. 6
The court then distinguished the Natanson case, stating there was no
deviation from the rules laid down there.
Another effort to explain Natanson involved a plaintiff who underwent
surgical treatment of a hernia by two doctors in two different operations,
with harmful results. He sued both physicians and, among a number of
other charges, asserted that each had failed to inform him of the risks
inherent in the hernia operation which he had performed. Reliance was
placed on Natanson. In the course of the opinion the court explained the
Natanson result as follows:
What we believe does need to be stated at this point is that in Natanson this court
held, in practical effect, that in the absence of an emergency, a physician has an
obligation to make a reasonable explanation and disclosure to his patient of the risks
and dangers which inhere in a proposed course of treatment (and, we may add, in a
proposed operation) to the end that whatever consent the patient gives to the pre-
scribed treatment (or operation) may be an informed and intelligent consent; that
where a physician, or surgeon, is silent and makes no disclosure whatever, he has
failed in the duty owed to his patient and the patient is not required to produce ex-
pert medical testimony to show that the doctor's failure was contrary to accepted
medical practice, but it devolves on the doctor to establish that his failure to make
any disclosure did, in fact, conform, under the confronting conditions, to accepted
professional standards; and that where actual disclosures have been made and are
ascertainable, then expert medical testimony is required to establish that the dis-
86. Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 10, 379 P.2d 292, 295 (1963).
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closures made did not accord to those which reasonable medical practitioners would
divulge under the same or like circumstances.8 7
After referring to its 1963 statements in Williams, the court continued its
explanation of Natanson as follows:
At no time has this court ventured to say that a physician or surgeon is under obliga-
tion to disclose any and all results which might possibly follow a medical or surgical
procedure. Nor would we now deny that there may well be circumstances under which
it would be bad therapeutic practice to disclose the nature, the procedures and the
possible harsh results of treatment. Even though a patient may be relieved of the
burden of showing, by expert evidence, that his doctor's silence deviated from ac-
ceptable medical practice, there is nothing in this rule which would preclude the
doctor, himself, from showing that his silence did, in fact, comply with medical stan-
dards under the facts then facing him. We continue to believe that the principles
enunciated in Natanson are valid.88
The court then examined the evidence in the cases before it and found
that one physician made no disclosure of adverse effects that might follow
a hernia operation, whereas the other had done so and had asked the
patient whether he had any questions. On this basis it was held that the
Natanson rule applied to the first physician and did not apply to the
second. A summary judgment in favor of the first physician was reversed
on this ground. As a tentative generalization, therefore, it appears that
in Kansas at the present stage of evolution of the Natanson progeny, a
physician must say something in the way of warning to remove the curse
of the Natanson case; but when he has done so, the issue of whether he
has gone far enough is recognized as a question on which expert testimony
is required.
In Missouri, in late 1965, the Supreme Court repudiated the broad
dictum that had appeared in the Mitchell opinion. The case was Aiken v.
Clary.89 It also involved an injury from insulin-shock therapy during
which plaintiff lapsed into a coma and suffered organic brain damage re-
sulting in total disability. The case was tried on a theory of negligence in
failing sufficiently to advise plaintiff of the hazards. The jury returned a
verdict for defendant. On appeal, the court recognized that the real issue
was whether the plaintiff would be required to present medical testimony
as to a standard to be followed in making disclosures of collateral risks.
It reviewed that Mitchell case, and, after stating that a division of opinion
existed in the country, it made the following statements:
We have reexamined this question and have concluded that the question of what
disclosure of risks incident to proposed treatment should be made in a particular
situation involves medical judgment and that expert testimony thereon should be re-
87. Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 396-97, 424 P.2d 488, 494-95 (1967).
88. Id. at 397, 424 P.2d at 495.
89. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
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quired in malpractice cases involving that issue. The question to be determined by
the jury is whether defendant doctor in that particular situation failed to adhere to
a standard of reasonable care. These are not matters of common knowledge or within
the experience of laymen. Expert medical evidence thereon is just as necessary as is
such testimony on the correctness of the handling in cases involving surgery or
treatment.... The question is not what, regarding the risks involved, the juror would
relate to the patient under the same or similar circumstances, or even what a rea-
sonable man would relate, but what a reasonable medical practitioner would do. Such
practitioner would consider the state of the patient's health, the condition of his
heart and nervous system, his mental state, and would take into account, among other
things, whether the risks involved were mere remote possibilities or something which
occurred with some sort of frequency or regularity. This determination involves medi-
cal judgment as to whether disclosure of possible risks may have such an adverse
effect on the patient as to jeopardize success of the proposed therapy, no matter how
expertly performed. (Defendant in this case testified that plaintiff was "real shook.")
After a consideration of these and other proper factors, a reasonable medical practi-
tioner, under some circumstances, would make full disclosure of all risks which had
any reasonable likelihood of occurring, but in others the facts and circumstances
would dictate a guarded or limited disclosure. In some cases the judgment would be
less difficult than in others, but, in any event, it would be a medical judgment. In mal-
practice cases involving surgery or treatment the fact that the procedure or the
operation is simple, rather than difficult and complex, does not eliminate the require-
ment that a plaintiff offer expert testimony that the procedure followed constituted
a failure to use that degree of skill and learning ordinarily used under the same or
similar circumstances by the members of defendant's profession in good standing
practicing in similar localities. Plaintiff would be required to offer such expert testi-
mony in order to make a submissible case. Likewise, in our judgment, it is not possible
in cases dealing with alleged failure to make adequate disclosure to say that there
must be expert medical testimony in more serious cases as to what a reasonable
medical practitioner would have done, but that such proof is not required in less
complicated cases. Such a distinction is suggested in some of the writing on this sub-
ject, but we do not subscribe thereto. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff, in order
to sustain his burden of proof, is required to offer expert testimony to shov what
disclosures a reasonable medical practitioner, under the same or similar circum-
stances, would have made, or, stated another way, that the disclosures as made by
the defendant do not meet the standard of what a reasonable medical practitioner
would have disclosed under the same or similar circumstances. To whatever extent
Mitchell v. Robinson, Mo., 334 S.W.2d 11, 79 A.L.R.2d 1017, is inconsistent with
the views herein expressed, it is disapproved.
Once plaintiff has offered sufficient proof to make a submissible case, including the
required expert testimony which we have discussed, then the ultimate determination
of whether defendant did or did not fail to disclose to plaintiff in accordance with
the standard of what a reasonable medical practitioner would have done is a jury
question under proper instructions from the courtY0
90. Id. at 674-75. That the Missouri Supreme Court still has a long way to go before it
fully understands the general problem is indicated by the fact that it cites Woods v. Brumlop,
71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962) for the proposition that some courts do not require expert
testimony as to a physician's obligation to disclose collateral hazards. The Woods case did
not involve this isue; it had been raised in the complaint but the court wrote: "[P]laintiff, at
the trial and now, relies entirely upon her contention and allegation that the breach of duty
1968]
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Because counsel, in reliance on Mitchell, had omitted to adduce expert
testimony, the case at bar was sent back for a new trial.
Summarizing this portion of the discussion, it appears that the courts
are approaching unanimity in the view that in a cause of action based on
medical negligence in failing to disclose collateral hazards, expert evidence
must be adduced to establish the standard against which to measure de-
fendant's conduct. In Kansas, a physician's failure to make any disclosure
in the face of a dangerous procedure casts the burden upon him to justify
his failure and, in the absence of such justification, the issue will be
decided against him as a matter of law. Perhaps judges in other states will
find this approach appealing to their sense of justice. Whatever qualifica-
tions and refinements ultimately emerge, it is obvious that in this kind of
"informed consent" case, plaintiff's counsel is confronted by a much
different task than in the battery cases.
C. Causal Relationship and Damages
In the establishment of causal relationship and the determination of
recoverable damages there are additional reasons for maintaining the
distinction emphasized in this paper.
1. Battery Cases
The essence of the legal wrong to plaintiff in a battery case is the touch-
ing itself which, standing alone, entitles him to substantial damages.9 1
Thus the issues of causation and damages are simple. All that need be
shown is that what was done differed substantially from that to which
consent was given. The cause of action is then complete. No case suggests
that it is necessary to show that if the truth had been told plaintiff would
have withheld consent.
The problem of the actual amount the jury may be allowed to award
is not unique; it appears in many kinds of tort cases and its resolution
involves conventional doctrines of damages and evidence.
2. Medical Negligence
In medical negligence cases, however, the issue of causation is more
complex in theory and practice. Plaintiff must show that if he had been
was the failure of defendant to tell plaintiff the truth in answer to a direct inquiry as to the
dangers that might result from such treatment, and upon plaintiff's reliance upon defendant's
alleged statement that no harm could result to her from such treatment. The testimony is
directly conflicting upon this question. . . .Under the circumstances of this case, a fact issue
was presented for determination by the jury upon which there was no necessity for expert
medical testimony." Id. at 226-29, 377 P.2d at 524-25. Thus, Woods was a fraud or deceit
case and it is believed no one has ever claimed that expert testimony is necessary to establish
a physician's obligation not to deceive the patient.
91. Lloyd v. Kull, 329 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1964) ($500 for unauthorized removal of a
mole); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913) ($1,000 for removal of a sesamoid
bone from the foot).
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fully advised as to the collateral risk he would not have submitted to the
procedure. This is a sort of "but for" rule. There must be a cause-in-fact
relationship between plaintiff's ignorance of the risk and his willingness
to go forward with the operation. The converse is also true, i.e., if it
appears that plaintiff knew of the risk all the time, the failure of the
physician to disclose it would have no causal connection with the injury.
This principle was recognized clearly at the outset in the Natanson
opinions. In the first opinion we find this recital: "There was evidence
from which the jury could have found that the appellant fully appreciated
the danger and the risk of the radiation treatment.192 As to this element,
the court said: "Under the rule heretofore stated, where the patient fully
appreciates the danger involved, the failure of a physician in his duty to
make a reasonable disclosure to the patient would have no causal relation
to the injury."93
How is this causal relationship to be proved? It may not be difficult. All
that plaintiff may need to do is testify that he would not have permitted
the operation if he had known the risk; then, unless his veracity is im-
peached, or his assertion is inherently incredible (e.g., because of the
slight danger involved), or there is proof that he actually knew of the
danger all along, he would at least make an issue for the jury.
In Natanson, in the second opinion, the court went even further. It
wrote: "While the appellant did not directly testify that she would have
refused to take the proposed cobalt irradiation treatments had she been
properly informed, we think the evidence presented by the record taken
as a whole is sufficient and would authorize a jury to infer that had she
been properly informed, the appellant would not have taken the cobalt
irradiation treatments. 94
Not all courts have been as generous with plaintiffs in permitting such
an inference. In one case, plaintiff suffered a substantial loss of vision in
her right eye alleged to have been caused by a hemorrhage following a
cataract operation. The claim was based in part on failure to disclose the
risk. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed, one of the grounds being that
there was no testimony from plaintiff that she would not have submitted
to the eye operation by defendant had she known of the risk inherent in
it. On this point the court wrote:
In this case, not only is there an absence of such proof, but facts in evidence tend
to negate the causal connection. The fact that the plaintiff proceeded to have this
operation upon her other eye by another surgeon, presumably after she was fully
informed of the inherent risks to this operation, is some evidence that disclosure by
the defendant of inherent risks would not have deterred her from having the earlier
operation. The risks of injury are not so great as to cause most reasonable persons
92. 186 Kan. at 400, 350 P.2d at 1099.
93. Id. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106.
94. 187 Kan. at 191, 354 P.2d at 673-74.
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to decline to have such a beneficial operation performed, one that has such a good
chance of restoring the sight of a substantially nonfunctional eye to an eye capable
of 20/20 vision with the aid of a lens. The plaintiff's failure to testify on this subject
is itself indicative to some degree ...
We believe that, if the theory of battery be inapplicable, the plaintiff failed to
make out a case insofar as proximate cause is concerned, and the motions for a di-
rected verdict and for judgment made by the defendant should have been granted. 95
In some cases it seems to be suggested that there is a requirement that
plaintiff produce evidence in addition to, or other than his own testimony
that he would not have had the operation had he known the risk. In a
case involving injury to laryngeal nerves during a thyroidectomy, plaintiff
sought to testify that had she known the danger she would not have had
the surgery. The North Carolina court approved exclusion of this evi-
dence, stating:
The plaintiff attempted to testify that if the defendant had advised her the operation
might involve paralysis of the vocal cords she would have withdrawn her consent.
The court excluded this testimony which presented a case of looking backward. Per-
haps the defendant with the benefit of a backward look would not have performed the
operation; but at the time decision was made to operate the surgeon was dealing with
a patient who had a diseased gland which failed to secrete the proper amount of
hormone. The medical experts, plaintiff's witnesses, say surgery in such event is in-
dicated. All cutting operations involve some risks. Possible dangers of an operation
had to be balanced against the certain danger of a diseased thyroid. Decision had to
be made before the operation. To permit the plaintiff to change the decision after-
wards is equivalent to looking at the answer without solving the problem.90
However, a subsequent pronouncement of the North Carolina Supreme
Court on this subject appears in Sharpe v. Pugh,97 which involved a claim
that defendant had breached his duty, inter alia, by failing to warn parents
of a child patient that the use of chloromycetin might cause aplastic
anemia. The case came before the Supreme Court on appeal from the
granting of a motion to strike this and certain other portions of the com-
plaint. The court considered whether the allegations relating to the failure
to warn were a proper part of the entire cause of action. After holding that
there was a duty to warn in view of the allegations in the complaint, the
court said: "[A]nd it may be reasonably inferred from plaintiff's allega-
tions that, if the facts concerning chloromycetin are as alleged by plaintiff,
Brenda's parents would not have consented to or permitted the use of
chloromycetin in defendant's treatment of her."
'98
Whatever subsidiary variations may develop in the future, the main
95. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 367, 409 P.2d 74, 83 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz.
App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966). Incidentally, the opinion of Judge Molloy in this case Is one
of the most perceptive and instructive that has come to the writer's attention.
96. Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 160-61, 136 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1964).
97. 270 N.C. 598, 155 SY..2d 108 (1967).
98. Id. at 605, 155 S.E.2d at 113.
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point in which we are interested at the moment is that in cases involving
medical negligence plaintiff does not establish his cause of action merely
by showing that the surgery or other medical procedure took place; it is
essential for him to go further and establish the causal relationship be-
tween his injury and defendant's failure to disclose collateral hazards and
risks. Once this causal relationship has been established, the question of
what damages may be recovered is answered by application of the con-
ventional doctrines of the jurisdiction on damages and evidence. In some
cases, expert medical testimony may be required to establish the relation-
ship between the surgery and the particular injurious phenomenon of
which plaintiff complains. This is normal practice in personal injury
actions, including those having nothing to do with professional liability.
D. Statute of Limitations
Another way in which the distinction between a battery action and a
negligence action may make an important difference is in determining the
applicable statute of limitations. In a substantial number of states the
limitations period applicable to battery actions is different from that
applicable to negligence actions, " including in the latter category, what
are sometimes called in the statute, "malpractice" actions.' In about
one-half of the states, the battery period is shorter than the negligence
period.' Thus courts are often required to decide whether to treat a
particular kind of allegation as setting forth a cause of action in battery
or in negligence. Frequently, the claim relates to consent or lack thereof
on the part of the patient. In this type of case there appears to be a strong
inclination on the part of the courts to treat the action in such a way that
the longer period applies. It is not difficult to understand this reaction.
An interesting example is found in a 1965 Oregon case. Plaintiff re-
ceived a spinal anesthetic shortly before the birth of a child and became
permanently paralyzed. She brought her action on a negligence theory
alleging improper positioning, handling, placing and securing her for
administration of the anesthetic. At the start of the trial, she asked leave
to amend her complaint to alleged negligence in other particulars, includ-
99. It is stated by Louisell and Williams that 31 states and the District of Columbia have
separate statutes of limitations pertaining to assault and battery. D. Louisell & H. Williams,
Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases § 1304 (1966).
100. Whether the terms "malpractice" and "negligence" mean the same thing can be a
troublesome question. In Gerba v. Neurological Hosp. Ass'n, 416 S.W2d 126 (Mo. 1967),
a hospital was sued for failure properly to attend and restrain an emotionally ill person who
injured herself. The court applied a two-year statute of limitations which related to action
against hospitals (and others) "for malpractice, error or mistake." It said: "We find it difficult
to understand plaintiff's contention that there is a difference between 'ordinary negligence'
and negligence relating to malpractice." Id. at 128.
101. See note 99 supra.
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ing the following: "(e) In failing to procure plaintiff's consent prior to
administration of a spinal anesthetic."' °2
The trial court "disallowed" the quoted amendment on the ground that
it stated a new cause of action for assault and battery which was barred
by the two years' statute of limitations period. The Supreme Court held
this ruling erroneous. While acknowledging that the performance of a
medical procedure to which there had been no consent, express or implied,
is "a technical battery," the court concluded that an action in negligence
for inadvertent failure to procure consent is an alternative remedy. In
analyzing its precedents, the court said:
The rule was applied by this court in Hively v. Higgs, 120 Or. 588, 253 P. 363, 53
A.L.R. 1052, where recovery as for a battery was sustained against a doctor who had
been authorized by his patient to operate on the septum of her nose, but removed her
tonsils while she was under an anesthetic. No negligence was alleged in that case.
On the other hand, we held in Gill v. Selling et al., 125 Or. 587, 267 P. 812, 58 A.L.R.
1556, that a doctor who, due to a mistake in identity, performed a spinal puncture
test on the wrong person was liable for negligence. This was a clear case of an un-
authorized operation; though the failure to obtain the patient's consent was due to a
mistake, the operation was nonetheless a technical battery and, no doubt, had the
plaintiff so chosen, that could have been made the basis of recovery instead of negli-
gence.
Hively v. Higgs does not hold, as defendant contends, that the exclusive remedy
for an unauthorized operation is assault and battery; the question was not presented.
In our opinion the requested amendment alleging an unauthorized use of a spinal
anesthetic did not state a separate cause of action for assault and battery, but merely
an additional specification of malpractice. The amendment is cast in terms of negli-
gence. Dr. Smith testified that it was the standard medical practice in the community
to secure the patient's consent before administering a spinal anesthetic. Violation of
that duty would be negligence or malpractice. "Malpractice, also sometimes called
'malapraxis,' means bad or unskillful practice, resulting in injury to the patient,
and comprises all acts and omissions of a physician or surgeon as such to a patient
as such, which may make the physician or surgeon either civilly or criminally liable."
Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence, 153, § 180. The act of a physician in performing
an unauthorized operation is referred to in the authorities as a technical battery. It
does not necessarily involve the kind of willful and intentional conduct that this
court dealt with in Denton v. Arnstein, 197 Or. 28, 250 P. 2d 407, where the defen-
dant intentionally twice drove his automobile into the back of the plaintiff's auto-
mobile. Speaking with reference to that conduct we said: "An assault and battery is
not negligence. . . .When defendant's conduct is wilful and intentional, it is no
longer negligence. . . ." 197 Or. at 45, 250 P.2d at 415. But, if a physician should in-
advertently (as in Shehee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 122 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La.
1954)) fail to obtain the consent of his patient before performing an operation, the
operation might constitute a technical battery, but it would still be a violation of
the established standard of care and actionable as malpractice. See Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 402, 350 P.2d 1093; 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670.103
102. Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Ore. 196, 231, 400 P.2d 234, 250 (1965).
103. Id. at 232-33, 400 P.2d at 250-51 (1965).
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This approach seems fairly close to that suggested by Professor McCoid
in his 1957 article," 4 and indeed the court cites his writing as authority
for its view.0 5 Other courts have reached similar conclusions, although
not always on the same reasoning. 10
For purposes of this article, it is not necessary to pursue these authori-
ties at length. Suffice it to say, that here is another phase of the litigation
in which counsel may find it a matter of great consequence to analyze
carefully the basic nature of the cause of action and not allow himself to
be misled by uncertain characterizations thereof.
III. CONCLUSION
What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.' o7
If these words are taken to suggest that one ought to be moved by
realities rather than labels, little objection will be raised. If, however, they
mean to state a principle that names are not important in communicating
and exchanging thoughts, the principle has very limited application. Cer-
tainly to a lawyer, whose main tools are ideas and words, names are of
enormous significance when used to identify the abstractions which make
up so much of the fabric of law. Inaccurate employment of names breeds
confusion, sometimes calamity. The decade of "informed consent" turmoil
since Salgo demonstrates the point.
At the time this is written most of the courts that have considered the
categories of cases discussed in this article have come to recognize the
realities involved, to penetrate the ambiguous term "informed consent,"
and to make the distinctions necessary for rational decision. Meanwhile,
there has been waste of time and effort, as in Aiken," s where an entire
trial was nullified because counsel had proceeded on a theory suggested
by the Missouri Supreme Court, which was belatedly acknowledged by
that court to be erroneous. Considering the body of authority that has
come into existence, however, there can no longer be any excuse for failure
by counsel to understand the legal issues as to the nature of the physician's
duty, requirements for proof of breach of duty, and the causation and
damages questions. Neither would there seem to be any excuse for the
paranoiac alarm occasionally sounded by representatives of the medical
104. See note 8 supra.
105. 240 Ore. at 234 n.S, 400 P.2d at 251 n.5. The court's dictum probably goes further
than Professor McCoid would, for it is not understood that he advocates alternative causes of
action for inadvertent failure to obtain consent.
106. E.g., Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
107. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene I.
108. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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profession that the "informed consent" rule has exposed them to inordi-
nate burdens and unjustifiable liabilities.
There is still an element of uncertainty as to the statute of limitations
to be applied in an "informed consent" case, if the state has separate
statutes for battery and negligence. The cases involving this difficulty,
however, are relatively rare.
It is instructive to note the manner in which the thoughtful suggestions
made by Professor McCoid in his 1957 article were distorted to lead in
exactly the opposite direction he contemplated. It is believed that he
meant to say (and did say) that the range of assault and battery liability
of physicians should be narrowed to embrace only those few cases in
which a physician intentionally does actual harm to a patient and that
liability for "malpractice" should be broadened to include the cases where
there is inadvertent injury or invasion of rights, including unpermitted
procedures as well as failure to advise the patient of collateral dangers.
The latter development would mean that in many such cases, expert evi-
dence would be required where it was not required before. For a time it
appeared that his suggestion was being utilized to transform failure to
give warning of collateral hazards into assault and battery liability in
which, generally, no expert evidence is necessary.
It is not out of place to draw attention to the venerable principle that
an appellate court ought to limit its decision (and opinion) to those issues
that must be decided to dispose of the case at bar. The obvious reason is
that a decision is much more likely to be wise and just if the issue has
been thoroughly briefed and argued by counsel for parties who have
sufficient personal stake in the outcome to prompt the best possible effort
in presenting the opposing sides of the case. This worthy doctrine seems
to have lost ground in some quarters during the past two decades. Ram-
bling, discursive opinions are increasingly common. The evil that they do
lives after them and underscores the soundness of the original precept.
One may be forgiven for yielding to the temptation to say also that
some appellate judges in the country create the impression that they deem
themselves heirs of the mantle of Cardoz6 and other judicial masters
whose decisions are landmarks and whose opinions are literary gems. Un-
fortunately many of these imitators lack legal depth or literary endow-
ment, or both. Their efforts are often garish and sometimes disastrous.
A famous legal scholar once wrote, "It is surprising how much may
sometimes be discovered by reading the cases."'1 9 He probably meant that
such study was a surer path to legal truth than abstract theorizing about
what the law ought to be. But some discoveries that result from reading
the cases are disconcerting ones. Our experience with "informed consent"
contains more than its share of these.
109. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 611 (1942).
